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Abstract
The topological (graph) structure of complex networks often provides valuable information about
the performance and vulnerability of the network. However, there are multiple ways to represent a
given network as a graph. Electric power transmission and distribution networks have a topological
structure that is straightforward to represent and analyze as a graph. However, simple graph
models neglect the comprehensive connections between components that result from Ohm’s and
Kirchhoff’s laws. This paper describes the structure of the three North American electric power
interconnections, from the perspective of both topological and electrical connectivity. We compare
the simple topology of these networks with that of random [1], preferential-attachment [2] and
small-world [3] networks of equivalent sizes and find that power grids differ substantially from these
abstract models in degree distribution, clustering, diameter and assortativity, and thus conclude
that these topological forms may be misleading as models of power systems. To study the electrical
connectivity of power systems, we propose a new method for representing electrical structure using
electrical distances rather than geographic connections. Comparisons of these two representations of
the North American power networks reveal notable differences between the electrical and topological
structure of electric power networks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research in complex networks [4] has elucidated strong links between network
structure and performance. Scale-free networks, which are characterized by strongly hetero-
geneous (power-law) node connectivity (degree), are uniquely robust to random failures but
vulnerable to directed attacks [2, 5]. Graphs with exponential degree distributions, such as
the random graph [1] and small-world networks [3] are more equally vulnerable to random
failures and directed attacks. Scale-free networks also tend to lose synchronization when
attacked at hub nodes [6], which is not the case for random graphs. And, for controllable
networks, scale-free networks can be synchronized by controlling a small number of highly
connected nodes [7], or even a single node [8]. On the other hand, ref. [9] shows that many
classes of networks fail to synchronize, arguing that degree distribution alone is not suffi-
cient to characterize the performance of a network. References [10, 11] describe how network
structure influences consensus (a form of synchronization), and how different ways of rep-
resenting a system a graph may affect the conclusions that one draws about performance.
Others [12, 13] show that it is possible to maintain synchronization in evolving network
topologies.
Given that network structure can dramatically influence performance, and given the size,
complexity and importance of electric power systems, it is not surprising that power grids
are the subject of substantial study from a complex networks perspective [14]. The fact
that data from many countries show a power-law in power system blackout sizes [15], leads
naturally to the conjecture that this might result from complexity in network structure.
Watts and Strogatz [3] measure characteristic path length and clustering in power grids,
and find similarities to the small-world network model. A number of studies measure the
degree distribution of various power grids with some reporting exponential [16–18] and others
reporting power-law/scale-free degree distributions [2, 19]. That studies of different power
grids in different countries or regions yield different topological structures is not necessarily
surprising. More surprising is that different analyses of identical grids (the transmission
system in the Western U.S.) have yielded different structural results [17, 19]. In particular,
this discrepancy stems from the model used in [19] which circumvents the exponential cut-off
reported in [16] by adding synthetic distribution nodes. This paper clarifies this uncertainty
by showing that, at least for the IEEE 300 bus network and the US Eastern Interconnect,
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an exponential degree distribution is a better fit to the data than a power-law distribution.
In addition to reporting an exponential degree distribution, ref. [17] also reports a power-
law in the topological betweenness of nodes in power grids, which is proposed as a potential
explanation for the power-law blackout frequencies. Reference [20] compares the Western US
power grid and the Nordic grid using the topological attack/failure model in [5], reports that
the Nordic grid has a more heavy-tailed degree distribution structure than the Western grid,
and provides some recommendations for increasing the robustness of power grids. Reference
[21] studies the European power grid and finds a positive correlation between topological
robustness measures and real non-topological reliability measures. Reference [22] uses results
from a topological analysis to design a method for generating synthetic power grids.
While they provide some insight into network structure, these topological studies largely
neglect Ohm’s and Kirchhoff’s laws, which govern flows in electric circuits. In some cases
pure topological models can lead to provocative, yet erroneous, conclusions about network
vulnerability [23–25]. To study electrical structure, refs. [26, 27] describe a measure of Elec-
trical Centrality for power grids. Bompard et al. [28, 29] combine topological models with
linearized power system models and propose new measures that can be useful in identifying
critical components. Also using a power-flow model, ref. [30] identifies relationships between
Wheatstone structures within power grids, reliability and efficiency.
A. Goals and outline of this paper
This paper aims to fill a number of gaps in the existing research on the structure of
electric power systems by identifying similarities and differences among the topological and
electrical structure of power grids and synthetic networks. The data used for this study
include several IEEE test cases, a 41,228 bus model of the US Eastern Interconnect (EI), a
11,432 bus model of the US Western Interconnect (WI), and a 4,513 bus model of the US
Texas Interconnect (TI). These models are substantially more detailed, and accurate, than
models that have been used in past structural studies of the North American power grid,
including previous work by the authors [27].
Section II provides a topological analysis of the two networks, showing how power grids
differ substantially from random [1], small world [3], and preferential attachment [2] graphs.
Section III proposes a new method for studying power grids as complex networks, based
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primarily on electrical, rather than topological, structure. Section IV discusses some impli-
cations of these results for future studies of power grid performance.
II. THE TOPOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF POWER GRIDS
The existing literature shows some disagreement over the topological structure of power
networks. Some report a power-law degree distribution [18, 19] whereas others argue that
an exponential fit is superior [16, 17]. Several report that power grids have a small-world
structure [3, 20, 31–33], from limited quantities of data. Some report that while the degree
distribution is exponential (such as is the case with random graphs), power systems share
properties with scale-free networks [17, 26, 34]. This section aims to clarify this and other
uncertainties regarding the structure of power grids using a larger, more accurate model
of the North American power grid than has been used in past studies. To determine the
extent to which power networks are similar to or differ from common abstract network
models, we compare the topology of the three US interconnections (West, East, and Texas)
to similarly-sized small-world, scale-free and random graphs. This comparison builds on
that in [22] by including a more comprehensive statistical description of not only power
grids topology but also their counterpart canonical graphs and by utilizing a larger, more
accurate representation of the North American power grid. Also, whereas ref. [22] focused
on the generation of random test networks, our goal is to precisely describe the differences
between topological and electrical structure.
To perform these comparisons, we represent each test network as an undirected, un-
weighted graph with n vertices/nodes and m links/edges. For the power grid models all
buses, whether generator, load, or pass-through, are treated equally. In this representation,
links can represent two or more parallel transformers or transmission lines, which means
that m may be slightly smaller than the number of branches in the power system model.
The set of all vertices and links in each graph, G, is {N,M}. The adjacency matrix for
graph GX is AX , with elements aij.
The following sub-sections describe the power grid data, the synthetic network models,
and the metrics that are used for comparison purposes.
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A. Power grid data
The data used in this study include several standard test power systems (available from
[35]), and a large model of the North American power grid composed by the US Eastern
Interconnect (EI), US Western Interconnect (WI) and US Texas (ERCOT) Interconnect
(TI). The Eastern Interconnect (EI) data come from a North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) planning model for 2012. The Western and Texas data come from the
FERC form 715 filings from 2005.[50]
The IEEE 300 bus test system has 411 branches, and average degree (< k >= 2m/n) of
2.73. Two of the branches are parallel links, so the graph size is: |G300| = {300, 409}. After
removing isolate buses and parallel branches from the EI data we obtain a graph (GEI) with
41,228 vertices, 52,075 links and an average degree < k >= 2.53. After applying the same
process to GWI we obtain a graph with 11,432 vertices, 13,734 links and an average degree
< k >= 2.40. For the Texas Interconnection |GTI | = {4513, 5532} and < k >= 2.45.
B. Synthetic networks
In order to compare power grids to common graph structures, we synthesized similarly
sized graphs using the small-world [3], preferential attachment (scale-free) [2], and random
[1] graph models, each of which is described below.
The early work on small-world networks [3] argues that power networks have the proper-
ties of a small-world system. Others also report this to be true [20, 31–33]. To test whether
this is indeed the case we generate a regular lattice with n nodes and approximately m links.
Nodes and links are initially laid out to form a ring lattice, by forming links to neighboring
nodes, such that each node a is connected a ↔ a − 1 (∀a > 1). A second link is then
created from node a to node a − 2 (for a > 2) with probability Pr(a ↔ a − 2) = m/n − 1,
giving approximately m links in total. After generating the regular lattice in this manner,
random re-wiring proceeds for each node with probability p as in [3]. We adjust p to obtain
a network with the same diameter as the corresponding power grid.
Similarly, several [18, 19] argue that power grids have a scale-free structure, as evidenced
by a power-law in the degree distribution. As with the small-world network we synthe-
size scale-free networks to match the size of each power network. To create a preferential
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attachment/scale-free (PA) graph with roughly n nodes and m links we modify the algo-
rithm described in [2] to allow for a fractional average degree < k >. For each new node
a we initially add one link between a and an existing node b using the standard roulette
wheel method. Specifically, node b is selected randomly from the probability distribution
Pr(a ↔ b) = kb/
∑n
c=1 kc, where kc is the degree at node c. After adding this initial link a
second is added with probability m/n − 1. Thus the addition of each new node results in
an average of 1 + (m/n − 1) = m/n new links, producing a preferential attachment graph
with n nodes and roughly m links.
Finally, we synthesize random graphs by randomly linking node pairs until there are
exactly m links in the system.
C. Measures of graph structure
If one of the above abstract models is a good model for power networks, then statistical
measures for the synthetic graphs should be similar to those that come from the power
networks. There are many useful statistical measures for graphs. Among the most useful
are degree distribution [2], characteristic path length [3], graph diameter [36], clustering
coefficient [3] and degree assortativity [2]. These measures provide a useful set of statistics
for comparing power grids with other graph structures.
The probability mass function (pmf) for node connectivity, or degree distribution, de-
scribes the diversity of connectivity in a graph. While random graphs have an exponential
(single scale) degree distribution, many real networks have a power-law degree distribution.
These scale-free networks tend to have highly connected hubs, which can make the network
vulnerable to directed attack [5]. The degree of node i in a graph with adjacency matrix A
is:
ki =
n∑
j=1
aij (1)
and the degree distribution is Pr(k = x) = nk/n, where nk is the number of nodes with
degree k. The complementary cumulative distribution function (ccdf) of degree in a scale-
free network will follow a power-law function:
Pr(k ≥ x) =
(
x
xmin
)−α+1
(2)
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where xmin is a minimum value for the power-law tail of the degree distribution. If the degree
distribution is exponential, a minimum value Weibull distribution provides a better fit to
the data:
Pr(k ≥ x) = e−(x−xminλ )
β
. (3)
While the size of a network can be measured by the number of nodes, n does not give much
information about distances within the network, which are often an indicator of network
performance. Two measures of network distance are commonly employed: diameter (dmax)
and characteristic path length (L). If D is a distance matrix, in which the off-diagonal
elements dij give the minimum number of links that one would need to traverse to get from
node i to node j, then the diameter of the network is:
dmax = max
ij
dij. (4)
The characteristic path length (L) is the average of all dij:
L =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
∀i,j
i 6=j
dij (5)
Additionally, Section III compares several networks using average nodal distance (< di >)
from each node i to other nodes in the network:
< di >=
n∑
j=1
dij
n− 1 (6)
The set of distance metrics described above are referred to as topological distances within
the next sections of this paper.
The manner in which a type of network increases in diameter (L or dmax) is a useful
indicator of structure. In small-world networks and random graphs, L increases roughly
with lnn [3], which gives these networks their characteristically small distances between
vertices. In a circular lattice L increases linearly with n, and in a regular 2-dimensional grid
L will increase with
√
n. Small-world networks differ from random graphs in that nodes
in small-world graphs are highly clustered, as they are in regular lattice or grid structures
[3]. Therefore if power networks were small-world in structure, we would expect to see
high clustering and small distances. Section IID describes an asymptotic analysis of L for
several power grids, which indicates that power grids fall somewhere between small-world
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and regular network structures. In this paper clustering is measured with the clustering
coefficient described in [3]:
C =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci (7)
where the clustering of node i (ci) is
ci =
ei
(ki(ki − 1))/2 (8)
and ei is the number of links within the cluster of nodes including node i and its immediate
neighbors Ni:
ei =
∑
∀j,k∈{Ni∪i}
ajk/2 (9)
Finally we compare the degree assortativity in the test networks. Degree assortativity
(r) in a network is defined in [37] as the extent to which nodes connect to nodes with similar
degree. Formally, assortativity is the correlation in degree for the nodes on opposite ends of
each link [38]:
r =
m−1
∑m
i=1 jiki −
[
m−1
∑m
i=1
1
2
(ji + ki)
]2
m−1
∑m
i=1
1
2
(j2i + k
2
i )−
[
m−1
∑m
i=1
1
2
(ji + ki)
]2 (10)
where m is the number of links in the network and ji/ki are the degrees of the endpoints of
link i.
D. Topological results
Our analysis of the IEEE 300 bus and the North American power grid models clearly indi-
cates that power networks are neither small world, nor scale-free in structure. Two hypoth-
esis tests regarding degree distribution provide evidence for this conclusion. Hypothesis 1
is that the power networks have the same degree distribution as the same-sized synthetic
network (Pr(k) ∼ Pr(k : EI)). Hypothesis 2 is that various networks have a power-law
degree distribution (Pr(k) ∼ k−α). We use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov t-test to evaluate each
hypothesis. For hypothesis 2, we determine the power-law distribution fit parameters (α
and xmax) using the method described in [39]. Table I shows results from these tests, as well
as other measures of network structure.
8
Table I: Comparison between power grid models and synthetic networks
Network Power network Random Small world Preferential attachment
IEEE
300
EI WI TI
p =
0.08
p =
0.0882
p =
0.18
p =
0.22
Nodes 300 41228 11432 4513 300 41228 11432 4513 300 41228 11432 4513 300 41228 11432 4513
Links 409 52075 13734 5532 409 52075 13734 5532 402 52209 13737 5527 409 52032 13719 5521
< k > 2.73 2.53 2.40 2.45 2.73 2.53 2.40 2.45 2.68 2.52 2.40 2.45 2.73 2.52 2.40 2.45
max(k) 11 29 22 18 7 12 11 11 6 6 6 6 32 419 185 125
C 0.11 0.068 0.073 0.031 0.008 0.00008 0.00015 0.0001 0.26 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.008 0.00054 0.002 0.004
L 9.9 31.9 26.1 14.9 5.7 11.2 10.3 9.02 9.6 34.2 22.9 16.9 4.4 7.1 6.8 6.1
dmax 24 94 61 37 12 27 24 20 24 101 59 41 9 17 17 15
r -0.22 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 0.044 0.004 -0.01 -0.03 0.034 0.12 0.052 0.03 -0.19 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09
Hyp. 1 - - - -
not
reject
reject**reject**reject** reject**reject**reject**reject** reject**reject**reject**reject**
Hyp. 2
mar-
ginal
reject**reject**reject* reject* reject**reject**reject** reject**reject* reject**reject**
not
reject
not
reject
not
reject
not
reject
est. of α 3.5 3.35 3.33 3.44 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.29 3.42 3.25 2.49 2.8 2.92 2.55
* Significant at the 0.01 confidence level.
** Significant at the 0.001 confidence level.
Tests of hypothesis 1 indicate that the degree distributions of the power networks do not
match those of the synthetic networks in all but one case: the IEEE 300 network compared
to a random graph. In Fig. 1, which shows the degree distributions for the large graphs, it
is clear that high-degree nodes are more frequent than would be found in random graphs or
small-world networks, but far less frequent than would be found in a similarly sized scale-free
network. Hypothesis 1 can be rejected with high confidence.
The tests of hypothesis 2 show, with high confidence, that none of the North Ameri-
can power network degree distributions follow a power-law (P < 0.001). The power-law
exponents found (α = 3.33 to α = 3.5) are steeper than what would generally be consid-
ered notable power-law distributions [39]. As expected the scale-free network fits well with
a power-law degree distribution. These results lead us to conclude, with confidence, that
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Figure 1: Cumulative degree distributions of the Eastern (EI), Western (WI) and Texas (TI) inter-
connections, along with degree distributions for synthetic networks—random (Erdős–Rényi, ER),
small-world (SW) and preferential-attachment (PA)—sized to match EI: |GEI | = {41228, 52075}.
Power networks have a heavy-tailed, but not power-law (scale-free) degree distribution.
power networks are not scale-free in topological structure.
The conjecture that power networks are small-world in structure requires some additional
analysis. While the clustering coefficients of the power grids are less that those of the
small-world graphs, C is an order of magnitude higher in power grids than in random
networks (table I). To test whether the small-world model is a good model for power grids,
we introduce a third hypothesis. Hypothesis 3 is that the characteristic path lengths of
power grids increase with an upper bound of L ≤ lnn, which is argued in [3] and [4] to be
the limit for distances in small-world networks. Figure 2 compares the characteristic path
lengths of several power networks with predicted values for L from the small-world, scale-
free, and random graph models. Path lengths in large power grids increase substantially
faster than lnn, which means that power grids fall somewhere between a regular grid, in
which path lengths scale linearly with n or
√
n, and a small-world network. Because L > lnn
for all of the power networks of substantial size (n > 30) hypothesis 3 can be safely rejected.
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Power networks, L
Power networks, < e >
Mesh grid, predicted L
ER, predicted L
SW, predicted L
PA, predicted L
Figure 2: Characteristic path length (L) and average electrical distance (〈e〉) of the power networks
as a function of graph size, n. L increases faster than lnn in the power networks, which indicates
that the small-world model does not fit particularly well. PL is the test system “case2383wp” from
[40]. The smaller networks are standard IEEE test cases, also available from [40].
Therefore, methods that are based on the assumption that power grids belong to the small-
world family of networks (e.g., [33]) may be misleading.
A number of other results in table I and Fig. 1 are notable. The small world networks had
much higher clustering than the power networks, largely because the re-wiring probabilities
(p) were chosen to keep distances similar to those found in the power networks, and were
thus very small. That the power networks had a fairly high degree of clustering may be
the result of geographic constraints that make very long-distance connections impractical in
most cases. Also we find that power networks have a small, negative degree assortativity.
In contrast, the small-world model shows a positive degree correlation, and, as expected,
the preferential-attachment and random graph models show nearly zero assortativity. The
negative assortativity in the power networks was found to result from substation buses
with a large number of radial connections (typically distribution feeders). If the degree-
1 “leaf nodes” are recursively removed the assortativity becomes very nearly zero. Upon
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recalculating the assortativity of EI, WI and TI after removing the leaf nodes, we find the
following changes in assortativity: EI, from r = −0.10 to −0.02; WI, from r = −0.08 to
−0.01; and TI, from r = −0.09 to −0.02.
III. THE ELECTRICAL STRUCTURE OF POWER GRIDS
While a thorough understanding of topological structure can be useful for some prob-
lems, such as producing synthetic power grids [22], data about topological structure are
not sufficient to describe the performance of power networks [24]. The connections between
components in a power grid depend not only on its topology, but also on the the physical
properties that govern voltages and currents.
One way to study connectivity between components in an electrical system is to look
at the properties of sensitivity matrices. Sensitivity matrices for power systems, such as
power transfer distribution factor matrices [41], measure the amount of influence that one
component has on another. The complement of a sensitivity matrix is a distance matrix,
which measures zero for component pairs that are perfectly connected, and large number
for component pairs that have very little influence on one another. To our knowledge, the
earliest work on electrical distances in power systems is in [42], in which the authors propose
a distance metric based on voltage magnitude sensitivities and use this metric to divide a
network into voltage control zones. They showed that the logarithmic voltage magnitude
sensitivity in a power grid can qualify as a formal distance metric (see Appendix), under
some conditions. Electrical distance measures have been applied to a number of reliability
and economic power system problems [43–45].
The concept of “Resistance Distance,” as proposed in [46], provides another method for
computing electrical distances. Resistance distances give the effective resistance between
points in a network of resistors. Here we extend the idea of resistance distance to represent
the marginal effect of an active power transaction between buses a and b on voltage phase
angle differences. Some transactions in a power system, such as those that occur over
short, low impedance lines, have relatively minor effects on a network. Other transactions
occur across high impedance paths, and thus result in large phase angle changes in the
network. Large phase angle separations can expose instabilities in the system. Reference
[47] proposes the use of voltage phase angle differences between areas as a measure of stress
12
in power networks. With this in mind we propose a distance metric based on the sensitivity
between active power transfers and nodal phase angle differences.
To do so we start with a network of resistors with current injections at each node. Such
a network can be described by a conductance matrix G, such that the current injection at
node a is:
Ia =
n∑
b=1
gabVb (11)
When there are no connections to ground in the circuit, G has rank n− 1, unless a voltage
reference is specified. G, thus defined acts as a Laplacian matrix for the resistive network.
To get around the singularity of G, we let node r be a voltage reference node, with Vr , 0.
The sub-matrix of G associated with the non-reference nodes (r¯) is full-rank, therefore we
can compute a sub-matrix G−1r¯r¯ , such that:
Vr¯ = G
−1
r¯r¯ Ir¯. (12)
If the diagonal element of G−1r¯r¯ associated with node a is g−1a,a, g−1a,a indicates the change in
voltage between nodes a and r as a result of a current injection at node a, which must
be withdrawn from node r. This resistance distance gives the sensitivity between current
injections and voltage differences. Therefore the resistance distance between a and r is equal
to g−1a,a,∀a. To measure the distance between a pair of nodes a and b, where a 6= b 6= r, one
can evaluate:
e(a, b) = g−1a,a + g
−1
b,b − g−1a,b − g−1b,a , (13)
which gives the voltage difference between a and b after injecting 1 A at a and withdrawing
1 A from b. In matrix form, where γ , diag(G−1r¯r¯ ), the calculation proceeds efficiently as
follows:
Er¯r¯ = 1γ
T + γ1T −G−1r¯r¯ − [G−1r¯r¯ ]T (14)
Er,r¯ = γ
T (15)
Er¯,r = γ (16)
where Er¯,r refers to vector of non-reference elements in the reference column of the distance
matrix. Resistance distance, thus defined, is proven to have the properties of a metric space
in [46].
13
To obtain sensitivities between power injections and phase angles, this definition requires
some modification. To produce a real-valued distance metric, we start with the top half of
the power flow Jacobian matrices:
∆P =
[
∂P
∂θ
]
∆θ +
[
∂P
∂|V |
]
∆|V | (17)
If we assume that voltages are held constant (∆|V | = 0), the matrix [∂P/∂θ] can be used to
form a distance matrix. Under the dc power flow assumptions (nominal voltages, no resistive
losses and small angle differences), [∂P/∂θ] is a Laplacian matrix that is analogous to G.
Even when these assumptions are relaxed, [∂P/∂θ] has most of the properties of a Laplacian.
Applying (13) with G = [∂P/∂θ] (with or without the dc approximations) results in a
distance matrix (E) that measures the incremental change in phase angle difference between
nodes a and b (θa − θb) given an incremental average power transaction between nodes a
and b, assuming that voltage magnitudes are held constant. As in [42], we empirically found
that E, thus defined, satisfies the properties of a distance matrix so long as all series branch
reactances are non-negative, as would be the case for nodes connected by a series capacitor
(see Appendix).
Using this metric we can define a measure that is roughly analogous to node degree,
but for a fully connected network with continuous weights for each node pair. To do so we
measure the average distance from each node a to other nodes in the system:
< ea >=
n∑
b=1
eab
n− 1 (18)
and invert it to obtain a measure of electrical centrality (modified from [26]):
ca =
1
< ea >
. (19)
The lower panel of Fig. 3 illustrates the electrical centrality of buses in the IEEE 300 bus
system. In this system there are a group of buses with very high electrical connectivity,
whereas the majority of buses have minimal centrality.
Electrical distances are notably different than topological distances. Figure 4 shows that
there is only a very weak correlation between electrical and topological distances (ρ = 0.24
for 〈ea〉 and 〈da〉). Many node pairs that are close topologically are distant in terms of
electrical distance. It is notable that the correlation is stronger at the higher (500kV and
765kV) voltage levels where there is less diversity in branch impedances.
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Figure 5 compares the distribution of electrical and topological distances obtained from
the EI, WI and TI models. The data indicate that topological distance distributions (D)
have exponential tails, whereas the electrical distance distributions (E) have power-law tails.
A. Representing electrical distances as an unweighted graph
The electrical distance matrix E describes the amount of connectivity between all node
pairs in the system. Because Kirchhoff’s and Ohm’s laws produce comprehensive connec-
tivity among all nodes in the system, the graph is weighted and fully connected (i.e., the
network is an undirected graph with n(n − 1) weighted links). In order to compare this
network with undirected, unweighted networks, we used the electrical distance matrix to
produce an unweighted graph representation of the electrical structure of a power network.
To do so, we kept the original n nodes, but replaced the m links with the m smallest entries
in the upper (or lower since E is symmetric) triangle of E. Thus we created a graph of
size {n,m} with links representing strong electrical connections rather than direct physical
connections. The adjacency matrix of this new graph (R) is defined as follows:
R :
rab = 1 ∀eab < trab = 0 ∀eab > t (20)
where t is a threshold adjusted to produce exactly m links in the network. The upper panel
of Fig. 3 shows the resulting electrical structure graph (R) for the IEEE 300 bus test case.
Comparison of the topological graph (A in Fig. 3) to the electrical one (R in Fig. 3)
shows a stark contrast between the electrical and topological structure of the test system. A
similar structural difference was found by comparing the topology and electrical structure
of North American systems. Table II summarizes the calculated metrics for the Eastern
Interconnection R matrix. Electrically speaking, a few nodes have a very high connectivity,
whereas the vast majority of vertices in R have no connections. In this way, power systems
share some properties with the scale-free network model; a few nodes have disproportionate
influence on a large portion of the network. However, this is not to say that power systems
will have all of the properties of scale-free networks (such as being highly vulnerable to
directed attacks), since the response of power systems to disturbances depends on a wide
variety of factors that are not captured in electrical distances.
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The clustering coefficient of R is also high relative to the value obtained from the equiv-
alent topological network. Both path lengths (L) and diameter (dmax) are smaller in the
electrical graph, indicating strong electrical connectedness within the core. The WI and TI
electrical networks are highly disassortative (r < 0), whereas the EI system is electrically
assortative (r = 0.33).
Table II: Topologically equivalent metrics for the reduced electrical distance matrices (R).*
Network EI (R) EI (A) WI (R) WI (A) TI (R) TI (A)
Nodes** 41228 (56) 41228 11432 (8017) 11432 4513 (2769) 4513
Links 52075 52075 13734 13734 5532 5532
< k > 2.53 2.53 2.40 2.40 2.45 2.45
max(k) 41171 29 3413 22 762 18
C 0.9996 0.068 0.9982 0.073 0.49 0.031
L 1.999 31.9 1.998 26.1 2.79 14.9
dmax 2 94 3 61 13 37
r 0.33 -0.10 -0.96 -0.08 -0.29 -0.09
* Metrics are calculated for the giant component.
** Numbers in parenthesis account for isolated nodes.
B. Electrical distance to load
The distance metric described by (12)-(14) gives sensitivities between arbitrary node
pairs in a power network. We can refine this metric to focus on electrical distances from
an arbitrary node to load nodes. This "electrical distance to load" measure describes the
sensitivity of consumption nodes to perturbations at other locations in the network. In this
section we determine the electrical distance to load of approximately 5600 buses within the
US mid-Atlantic (PJM) portion of the EI model. From the electrical distance matrix, E,
we plot (Fig. 6) the amount of the total system load that is reachable at various electrical
distances. Comparing this to a similar graph for topological distances illustrates the differ-
ence between the two. Topologically there are a few nodes that are within 1 link (dab ≤ 1,
or 5.3% of the topological diameter, dmax) of about 2 GW of load, which is 1% of the total
system load of 146.8 GW (lower panel of Fig. 6). Electrically, there are a few nodes that
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are within eab ≤ 0.011 (0.5% of the electrical diameter, emax) of 40 GW (27%) of load. This
indicates that a small number of nodes have a very high electrical influence on the system
as a whole. Typically, these are high voltage buses (500kV and larger) that show very high
electrical centrality.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Power grids have been an appealing topic for network analysis in recent years, but the
existing body of literature has produced some mixed results, particularly related to measur-
ing the structure of power networks and connections between structure and performance.
We have assessed the topological structure of the North American electric power network,
and have compared it with a structural analysis based on a measure of “electrical distance,"
which measures network sensitivities. Electrical distance is more closely related to the phys-
ical laws governing behavior in electrical networks than topological distance or connectivity.
In the appendix we show the conditions under which the proposed distance measure qualifies
as a formal distance metric. Simpler impedance-based measures of electrical distance used
elsewhere in the literature do not always meet the criteria for a proper distance metric.
Our analysis of the topological structure of the Eastern, Western and Texas Interconnects
clearly suggests an exponential degree distribution rather than a power-law. We thus reject
the conjecture that the observed power-law distribution in blackout sizes arises due to a
power-law in the grid topology. Further, we observe significant differences between power-
grid topologies and the topology of synthetic small-world networks. Distances between nodes
increase much faster than the log of network size, and clustering is not as high as is found
in true small-world networks. On a topological basis, we thus conclude that power grids are
neither scale-free nor small-world in topological structure.
When we measure network structure based on electrical distance, however, we find a
power-law distribution in electrical distances for all three Interconnects in the North Ameri-
can power network. It may be that this power-law distribution contributes to the empirically
observed power-law distribution in large blackout sizes. Future work will seek to charac-
terize the nature of this relationship. Also, we find that the correlation between electrical
and topological distance is weak, though it increases for higher-voltage lines. When we look
at the electrical distances between buses and loads in power networks, we find that a small
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number of nodes are tightly electrically connected to large percentages of load in the system,
despite being relatively distant topologically. Since our electrical distance measure captures
network sensitivities rather than physical connectivity, the observed heterogeneous structure
suggests that perturbations (such as those caused by a volitional attack or changes in gener-
ator pricing) may have non-local effects more often than would be expected from the grid’s
topological structure. Our work suggests that future endeavors to relate structure and per-
formance in electrical networks should focus on characterizing network sensitivities rather
than focusing narrowly on topological connectivity. Furthermore, this work suggests that
circuit theory can be a useful tool in characterizing the connectivity and thus performance
of complex networks.
Appendix. Conditions under which electrical distance qualifies as a formal distance
measure
To qualify as a distance metric, a metric space d(x, y) must map pairs of elements in a
set in a way that describes the dissimilarity among any element (x, y, z), and must have the
properties of non-negativity (d(x, y) ≥ 0), symmetry (d(x, y) = d(y, x)), identity (d(x, y) =
0⇔ x = y) and the triangle inequality (d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z)) [48].
Equations (13)-(14) describe our measure of electrical distance e(a, b), given a sensitivity
matrix G. Here we discuss the conditions under which e(a, b) qualifies as a proper distance
metric in some metric space. Following [46, 48], a distance metric e(x, y) on an arbitrary
metric space gives a measure of dissimilarity between arbitrary objects x and y, and satisfies
the following properties for all elements a, b, c:
• Symmetry: e(a, b) = e(b, a)
• Identity: e(a, b) = 0⇐⇒ a = b
• Non-Negativity: e(a, b) ≥ 0
• Triangle Inequality: e(a, b) + e(b, c) ≥ e(a, c).
The discussion in this appendix will focus on the last of these properties, the triangle inequal-
ity. Lagonotte ([42]) found that an electrical distance measure related to voltages generally,
but not always, obeyed the triangle inequality. We demonstrate a similar finding here for an
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analogous distance measure which is based upon real power sensitivities. Building on [42],
we also characterize the conditions under which the triangle inequality will fail to hold for
this electrical distance measure.
Recall, from the discussion surrounding (14), that the sensitivity matrix G is replaced
with [∂P/∂θ] from the power flow Jacobian. In the dc power flow model [49], this sensitivity
is simply equal to the system susceptance matrix B. For an arbitrary, connected three-node
network, following (14), the electrical distance matrix E can be written as:
0 x12(x13+x23)
x12+x13+x23
x13(x12+x23)
x12+x13+x23
x12(x13+x23)
x12+x13+x23
0 x23(x12+x13)
x12+x13+x23
x13(x12+x23)
x12+x13+x23
x23(x12+x13)
x12+x13+x23
0
 (21)
Applying the triangle inequality to (21), for each of the three triplets, leads to the following
sufficient condition on the three reactances:
(x12x23 ≥ 0 ∩ (x12 + x23 + x13) > 0) ∪ (22)
(x12x23 < 0 ∩ (x12 + x23 + x13) < 0)
which is clearly satisfied for a strictly positive set of reactances. Figure 7 shows the vol-
ume in x12, x13, x23 space where violations of the triangle inequality are observed, for all
combinations of xab ∈ [−1, 1]. Areas of the surface where
e(a, b) + e(b, c)− e(a, c) < 0 (23)
were shaded, showing combinations of x12, x13, x23 that yielded triangle inequality violations.
Accordingly, if one or more of the branch reactances is less than zero, a violation may occur.
The extension of these analytical results to the ac power flow case remains for future work.
However, in order to explore the triangle inequality conditions for a real power system we
drew a random sample of 106 node triplets from the Eastern Interconnect E matrix and
tested against (23). This empirical evaluation showed that the triangle inequality holds for
99.81% of the node triplets.
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RA
Figure 3: The upper panel shows a graphical representation of the electrical topology of the IEEE
300 bus system (R), formed by replacing the 409 transmission branches with 409 shortest distance
electrical links (the 409 smallest eij such that i > j). The lower panel shows the topology (A) of
the 300 bus network with nodes drawn with sizes proportional to their electrical centrality (19).
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Figure 4: The mean topological and electrical (18) distances of buses, at different voltage levels,
within the three North American power networks (EI, WI and TI). The average correlation between
topological distance and electrical distance is low (ρ = 0.24), however the correlation at the higher
voltage levels (ρ765 = 0.43, ρ500 = 0.65) is higher.
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Figure 5: Complementary cumulative probability distributions for electrical and topological dis-
tances (dab and eab) for the US Eastern, Western and Texas Interconnections. For the three dis-
tributions of topological distances, hypothesis 2 (see Section IID) is rejected (p < 0.001). For the
two larger distributions of electrical distances (EI and WI), hypothesis 2 is not rejected and the
estimates of α are: αEI = 3.49 and αWI = 3.36. For the distribution of electrical distances in TI,
hypothesis 2 is rejected (p < 0.001).
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Figure 6: Electrical distances to loads for the PJM portion of the US Eastern Interconnect. The
horizontal axis shows load, in MW. The vertical axis for the top panel shows the probability of
a randomly selected node reaching X MW of load within electrical distance eab. The lower panel
shows the same result for topological distances. Comparing the purple line in the top figure (5% of
emax) with the blue line in the bottom figure (~5% of dmax) we see that it is possible to reach large
amounts of load by traversing over short electrical distances, relative to the topological distances
that one would need to cover to reach the same amount of load.
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Figure 7: Illustration of the conditions under which three reactances (x12, x23, x13) connecting a
three-bus network satisfy the triangle inequality. Combinations that result in a triangle inequality
violation are shaded. The two panels show the conditions from different perspectives. The red
plane (0 = x1 + x2 + x3) separates vertically the volumes corresponding to failure and success.
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